As a result, a network of small businesses created by the Russian front Counterintelligence Service in Moscow, Yekaterinburg and other cities in 1994 to ‘buy’, radioactive and dual-use metal which was largely dismantled in 1995. In Consequently, FSB officials assume that the Russian authorities are able to intercept only 30-40 percent of the material that disappeared from Russian nuclear facilities. (Lee, 1997, p.117) The situation is exacerbated by the lack of effective mechanisms of cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to combat nuclear smuggling, while the CIS countries have signed agreements or Memoranda of prohibited drugs or arms trafficking. For various reasons, some Russian officials for their efforts against smuggling as a national priority. For example, the Ministry of Atomic Energy (1INATOM l) and officials have been openly critical covert operations as the “provocation”, saying it created an artificial market for nuclear materials. This assumption is wrong and should be considered in the context of very dubious MINATOM activities.w In the light of other evidence presented here, the official position of Russia on nuclear smuggling Discouragingly seems somewhat superficial and shortsighted. (Lee, 1997, p.117) Between mid 1993 and early 1996, at least six attempts to divert highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the area of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk. In January 1996, this “business” had apparently metastasized to the Pacific Fleet, where about seven kilograms ofHEU were stolen from a base of Sovetskaya Gavan. An assistant military prosecutor of the Northern Fleet is investigating rumors of a gang of Murmansk, St. Petersburg “, believed that Russian naval officials offer $ 400,000 to $ 1,000,000 for each kilo of obtaining HED.